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ABSTRACT
In mid 1986 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan signed petroleum
exploration and development agreements with two U.S. oil companies.
These agreements cover tracts in the Jordan Valley, Azraq and Al Jafr
regions of the country. Under the terms of the agreements, a company
is required to pay for all exploration and development costs. If oil
is discovered , it will receive a fixed share of annual oil
production, roughly 25%, plus a phased in recovery of exploration and
development costs.
These agreements suffer from two types of incentive problems.
Firstly, an exploration effort incentive problem in which a contractor
chooses exploration effort levels that are generally too low in
relation to the level of effort that maximizes total project expected
profits. Secondly, an undercompletion problem in which a contractor
chooses to forego development of jointly profitable petroleum
discoveries, because its share of development profits is not
sufficient to cover the development costs it must bear.
This thesis develops an exploration effort-probability of
discovery model which is used to quantify the magnitude of the
incentive costs in the Jordanian contracts. These incentive costs are
measured as the difference between the expected profits that
Jordan would receive under the terms of the 1986 Agreements and
under agreements in which Jordan is assumed to have both perfect and
imperfect information regarding contractor exploration and development
effort.
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1.0 Introduction
1. 1 Problem Definition
In mid 1986 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan signed oil and gas
exploration and development agreements with two U. S. oil companies.'
These agreements cover tracts in the Jordan Valley, Azraq and Al Jafr
regions of the country.2 Under the terms of the agreements, a
company is required to pay for all exploration and development costs.
If oil is discovered, it will receive a fixed share of annual oil
production, roughly 25%, plus a phased in recovery of exploration and
development costs. The rate of recovery of exploration and
development costs is subject to an annual limit equal to 40% of the
value of oil production in a given year.'
Two types of incentive problems may arise from this agreement
sharing rule. Firstly, a contractor may choose a level of exploration
effort that is too low in relation to the effort that maximizes total
project expected profits. Secondly, a contractor may choose to forego
development of a jointly profitable oil discovery, because its share
of profits is not sufficient to cover the development costs it must
bear. In either case, the resource owner (Jordan) may experience
lower expected profits than would be the case under alternate profit
sharing rules.
Typically, exploration effort incentive problems arise because a
resource owner cannot precisely monitor a contractor's level of
exploration effort. If the probability of discovering oil depends
direclty on the level of exploration effort, a resource owner must
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gear its reward structure to discovery size. Thus, only indirectly
through a discovery contingent reward mechanism is a contractor
induced to undertake a particular level of exploration effort.
Depending on the structure of a reward mechanism, a contractor may or
may not choose a level of exploration effort that maximizes total
project expected profits. Not surprisingly, we see that reward
mechanism (sharing rule) design not only influences the relative
profits of the parties to an exploration and development agreement,
but also the magnitude of total profits to be shared. Note that the
exploration effort incentive problem may be exacerbated by the
undercompletion problem, because foregone jointly profitable discovery
developments reduce the magnitude of total profits available for
sharing.
These two types of incentive problems are very likely to occur
for the Jordanian exploration and development contracts. The
government of Jordan does not possess the necessary technological
expertise to develop domestic petroleum reserves itself nor the
information to perfectly monitor the activities of an outside
contractor. Hence, a contractor is relatively free to choose a level
of exploration effort that is in its own interests and not necessarily
those of Jordan. Also, after making a discovery a contractor is
relatively free to choose whether to develop it because only the
contractor possesses the relevent information as to discovery size,
development costs and so on.
I propose to quantify the potential incentive problems inherent
in the structure of these Jordanian petroleum exploration and
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development contracts using an approach developed by Grossman and Hart
(1983). To achieve this objective, an exploration effort - discovery
size probability model is developed to calculate the expected profits
to Jordan under three possible sharing rules:
(1) A first best sharing rule under which Jordan can capture
all discovery development profits. This requires that
Jordan can perfectly monitor exploration effort and thus
structure a "forcing contract" which only just compensates a
contractor for putting forth a particular level of
exploration effort. This level of effort is set so as to
maximize the expected value of potential discoveries less
exploration costs. Under a first best rule, a contractor
receives a fixed payment for its effort, while Jordan
recieves an uncertain payment that depends on the amount
of oil discovered.'
(2) A second best sharing rule under which both Jordan and a
contractor "share" the profits of oil discoveries with the
contractor bearing all exploration costs. This contract
structure recognizes the fact that Jordan cannot
perfectly monitor a contractor's exploration effort and must
therefore create a reward mechanism that links exploration
effort to discovery size. A second best sharing rule is a
constrained optimum in the sense that Jordan can structure
the rule to maximize its own expected profits subject to
some given maximizing behaviour of a contractor.5
Assumptions' regarding a contractor's behaviour toward
risk will determine the extent to which second best
expected profits are less than first best expected profits.
(3) The 1986 Agreement sharing rule under which both Jordan and
a contractor "share" oil production in the manner described
above.
Using this framework incentive costs can be measured as the difference
between expected profits under a first best sharing rule and expected
profits under a proposed alternative. The the closer a contractual
sharing rule comes to a first best theoretical optimum the better it
is.
Blitzer, Cavoulacos, Lessard and Paddock (1985) and Blitzer,
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Lessard and Paddock (1984) have identified a number of risk related
issues that should be factored into the design of exploration and
development contractual arrangements, namely:
(1) commodity price risk;
(2) geological risk;
(3) investment cost risk - cost overruns in both exploration
and development;
(4) fiscal risk - risk that the host government will change tax
structures, impose exchange controls or institute other
fiscal measures that while not directly related to the
contract will have a substantive effect on ex post returns.
(5) political risk - risk that the host government will
unilaterally change some or all of the contract terms
ex post.
They assert that "pareto improvements" in contract structure can be
achieved by explicitly allocating specific risks to particular
parties according to their ability to bear these risks. For example,
if,a host country's GNP is highly correlated with oil prices, then a
pareto improvement may be achieved by allocating this risk to a
multinational oil company, which has investors who can diversify away
this risk in international equity markets.
Since the focus of my analysis is on the incentive problems of
petroleum exploration and development contracting, the sources of risk
mentioned above are not treated explicitly in the analysis, but are
taken as given. However, this does not imply that the above issues
cannot be treated in a fashion consistent with the framework of
Grossman and Hart. Political risk, commmodity price risk and fiscal
risk could result in different valuations of oil discovery sizes
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by both Jordan and a contractor. Oil discovery valuation
differences could arise because each party may have different
discount rates and a priori probability distributions for key
variables. These factors can be explicitly allowed for through
alternate specifications of the objective functions and constraints of
each party within Grossman and Hart's optimization framework.
1.2 Overview of Study Methodology
The exercise of empirically estimating the incentive problems of
the 1986 Jordanian contracts is broken down into three parts.
(1) Valuation of petroleum discovery sizes via a capital
budgeting model that calculates the net present value
of cash flows for developing a discovery of a given
size.
(2) Estimation of an exploration effort - discovery size
probability matrix that relates exploration effort, as
measured by the number of wildcat wells drilled, to the
probability of finding an oil discovery of a given size with
an NPV estimated according to (1) above.
(3) Calculation of ex ante benefits to both Jordan and the
contractor under first best, second best and the
the 1986 Agreement sharing rules. Ex ante benefits will
depend on the number of wells drilled and the type of
sharing rule employed. 5
The theoretical and empirical issues required to accomplish (1)
through (3) above are addressed in Sections 2.0 to 6.0. Section 2.0
provides an overview of Grossman and Hart's theoretical framework for
rlr'Tb~^L-ir·-iL1~~EFRU~iVI"~·~lilEna~* ·m~i~UII~~
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analysing incentive problems, as well as discusses the strengths and
weaknesses of their approach for this particular application. Section
3.0 summarizes the terms and conditions of the 1986 Jordanian
contracts and their implications for sharing the benefits of discovery
development. Section 4.0 develops a financial model of exploration
and development cash flows and overlays a standard capital budgeting
methodology to estimate total project value, as well as value under
the sharing rule implicit in the 1986 Agreement. Section 5.0 provides
estimates of exploration effort - discovery size probability matrices
under a number of assumptions about the geological structure of the
Jordanian exploration tracts and the productivity of wildcat well
drilling. Finally, Section 6.0 provides a number of empirical
estimates of the incentive costs of the 1986 Jordanian contracts
relative to first best and second best sharing rules using the
technology developed in the previous sections.
1.3 Summary Of Empirical Results
The analysis of Section 6.0 reveals that there are potentially
large incentive costs under a number of circumstances. If the sharing
rule implicit in the 1986 Agreements is implemented, then Jordan's ex
ante expected profits are likely to be significantly lower than first
best and second best expected profits for low to moderate levels of
potential oil discoveries. Specifically, with median oil discoveries
of 500 to 2500 barrels per day with logarithmic variance of 20%, the
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incentive costs of the 1986 Agreement will range between 100% and 30%
of first best expected profits and 100% and 12% of second best
expected profits." As discovery potential increases, the incentive
costs of the 1986 Agreement sharing rule falls. For median discovery
levels of 5000 barrels per day, the incentive cost falls to 18% of the
first best expected profits and will continue to fall to around 10% of
expected profits for median discovery sizes of 25,000 barrels per day
or more. For median discovery sizes of 25,000 barrels per day second
best incentive costs are in the 1% to 4% range, depending on wildcat
probability level. Table 1.1 provides estimates of expected profits
to Jordan under first best, second best and 1986 Agreement sharing
rules for a number of geological scenarios.
Analysis indicates that second best sharing rules are feasible
even for very low median oil discovery levels of around 500 barrels
per day and that for median discovery levels of around 1,000 barrels
per day their incentive cost is a very respectable 36% of the first
best expected profit. As median discovery levels rise to 10,000
barrels per day or more, second best incentive costs fall well below
4% of first best expected profits.
The most striking result of the empirical analysis is that the
shape of the 1986 Agreement sharing rule is radically different from
the shape of the second best sharing rules. Figures 1.1 and 1.2
sketch the shape of the 1986 Agreement and second best sharing rules.
Not surprisingly, we see that the contractual sharing rule is not
generous enough relative to the second best sharing rule at low
realized discovery sizes (500 to 5,000 barrels per day) and is too
-12-
generous at high realized discovery sizes (10,000 + barrels per day).
These differences result in significantly lower expected profits for
Jordan.
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Table 1.1
Expected Profits Accruing To Jordan
Median 1986 First
Discovery Agreement Best
Size Rule
(bbl/day) ($ M) ($ M)
Wildcat Probability =
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
0.0
0.0
110.0
325.0
911.3
3,456.7
10.4
36.5
148.4
400.9
1,068.1
3,922.5
Second
Best
Rule
($ M)
0.2
7.0
27.4
124.7
356.0
989.8
3,757.8
Wildcat Probability = 0.4
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
0.0
28.9
129.0
359.8
952.5
3,499.1
14.7
42.6
157.0
411.4
1,080.6
3,937.2
11.6
35.5
136.8
381.3
1,021.6
3,835.5
Wildcat Probability = 0.6
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
0.0
37.9
139.1
368.2
970.7
3,544.9
16.6
44.1
160.4
415.6
1,085.4
3,943.0
14.3
39.0
148.1
393.8
1,047.7
3,874.9
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2.0 A Framework For The Analysis Of The Exploration Effort
Incentive Problem
2.1 A Principal-Agent Approach
The purpose of this section is to introduce both a methodology
and a terminology with which to analyze the incentive problems
imbedded in the structure of the 1986 Jordanian contracts for
petroleum exploration and development. It is of interest to determine
whether the production sharing rules outlined in these contracts can
be "improved" upon from the perspective of Jordan, the owner of the
petroleum resources. "Improved" means whether Jordan's
ex ante expected profits can be increased by using alternate
petroleum output or cash flow sharing rules.
This exploration and development contracting problem can be
examined within the context of the principal-agent literature, where
Jordan is considered the principal and the oil company is considered
the agent. Grossman and Hart (1983) provide an empirically tractable
approach to the principal-agent problem which is briefly summarized in
this section. Formally, the principal is assumed to be a risk
neutral, expected profit maximizing entity, whereas the agent is
assumed to be a risk averse, expected utility maximizing entity. The
principal must delegate the running of a project to an agent-manager,
whose specific actions (effort levels) cannot be directly observed.
However, the principal can observe the outcomes of these actions,
which are taken to be the project's possible profit levels. The
relationship between an agent's efforts and a project's possible
outcomes is characterized by an (n x m) effort-outcome matrix, whose
-17-
ij-th element denotes the probability of gross profit level j,
conditional on action 1.
Grossman and Hart's approach decomposes the principal's problem
into a computation of the profits of each action taken by an agent and
a choice of the profit maximizing action. The principal chooses the
incentive scheme which minimizes the expected cost of inducing an
agent to choose that action. Under the assumption that an agent's
preferences over outcomes are independent of the action taken, the
cost minimization problem reduces to a convex programming problem.
The principal solves the convex program for each action available to
an agent and subtracts the expected cost of inducing an agent to take
the action from the expected profits of the action to arrive at a net
profit. The action (and accompanying incentive scheme) which yields
the highest net profit to the principal, will yield his optimal
strategy. Grossman and Hart refer to this optimal strategy as the
"second best" outcome, given that the agent's actions are unobservable
to the principal.
The principal's programming problem can be represented as
follows. Choose I, . . . In to minimize:
n
C(a )= (a )I ;
S-1 (1.1)
n
> (1.2)
s.t. pi (ak )U(ak,I) = U*
n n
s.t. pi (ak)U(ak,IL) = pi (aj )U(aj ,Ii)
i- i - 1
for all j = 1 ... m actions (1.3)
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a, = cost of actions k = 1 ... m available to agent
I, = outcome contingent renumeration paid by principal
to agent
U(a,I) = agent's utility function assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable
pi (a,) = probability of outcome I conditional on action k
U" = agent's reservation level of utility
C(a, ) = expected cost to principal of inducing agent
to undertake action k
The optimization problem outlined above states that a principal can
determine the least cost incentive scheme that induces an agent to
undertake a particular action by minimizing expected cost, equation
(1.1), subject to the constraint that the agent is an expected utility
maximizer, who will not undertake a particular action unless the
expected utility from undertaking that action dominates the expected
utility from undertaking all other actions, equation (1.3), and yields
a utility as least as great as his reservation utility which he
forgoes by undertaking the project, equation (1.2).
The set of solutions to the above programming problem can be
represented by the ordered triplets (C, ,a ,, ), k = 1 ... m. Thus for
each action, ak , the principal can determine the least cost incentive
scheme, 1,, (a vector of incentives for each outcome q, ), which will
induce an agent to undertake action a, at least expected cost, C,.
Hence, a principal's optimal strategy will be the incentive scheme
-19-
which maximizes his expected profits:
B, - C, over all actions k = 1 ... m, where (1.4)
B, = .Pi(a, )q, expected gross profit to (1.5)
i=1 principal for action k
q = project outcome to be shared I = 1 . . . n
Denote the optimal strategy as the ordered triplet (C',a',I'),
where B' - C' = argmax (k) B,, - C,.
Grossman and Hart's analytical framework allows for a relatively
straightforward calculation of the costs of employing an agent to
manage a project relative to a "first best" situation, where the
principal can either directly observe an agent's effort levels or can
undertake the project itself. This "agency cost", AC,
is calculated as:
AC = FB - (B'- C'), where (1.7)
FB = argmax (k] B, - ak (1.8)
The "first best" and "second best" expected net profit levels are
useful benchmarks with which to compare the expected profits of other
contract forms and thus judge their ex ante economic efficiency.
Section 2.2 below attempts to motivate the application of this
methodology to the 1986 Jordanian contracts.
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2.2 Application of The Principal-Agent Framework To The
1986 Jordanian Contracts
Petroleum exploration and development can be viewed as a process
in which prior to exploration an oil company faces an a priori
probability distribution characterizing the magnitude of potential
petroleum discoveries. This a priori probability distribution is
based on current information regarding the geological characteristics
of the area under investigation. Using this information, a decision
is made concerning exploration effort, i.e, how many wildcat wells to
drill. After drilling, if a discovery is made, then the magnitude of
potential petroleum resources is known to a far greater degree of
certainty. However, if no discovery is made, some information
concerning the potential magnitude of petroleum reserves is still
gained. One can view the exploration process as a Bayesian updating
process in which after each round of drilling prior probability
distributions concerning the magnitutde of oil discoveries are updated
to form posterior distributions, which are in turn used to determine
the optimal drilling effort for the next round of exploration.
Therefore, in theory at least, the optimal intertemporal drilling
program can be solved by means of a dynamic program, in which the
economic agent seeks to maximize ex ante expected profits or utility
at each point in time in a recursive fashion. In order to fit the
general characterization of the exploration and development decision
making process into Grossman and Hart's framework, it is necessary to
collapse the intertemporal exploration decision problem into a single
period decision problem. This can be accomplished by characterizing
-21-
the exploration-development decision process as follows:
(1) Choose a once and for all level of exploration effort,
i.e, number of wildcat wells to be drilled.
Drilling may or may not lead to a discovery.
(2) If oil is discovered, choose to develop the discovery,
if it is profitable to do so.
The above characterization of the exploration-development process
suggests an effort-outcome probability matrix of the type used by
Grossman and Hart. This probability matrix can be constructed by
determining the "value" of a discovery of a certain size and then
using geological data to determine the probabilities of achieving
these discovery sizes, given certain levels of drilling effort.
Section 4.0 develops a capital budgeting methodology to estimate
the present values of each discovery size for the project as a whole,
as well as to Jordan and an agent-contractor under terms of the 1986
Agreement. Section 5.0 develops a methodology to estimate the
probabilities of achieving given discovery sizes based on exploration
effort, L.e, the number of wildcat wells drilled.
There are two fundamental problems with the approach I am using
to estimate incentive costs of exploration and development contracts.
Firstly, collapsing the exploration - development decision making
process into a static optimization program ignores efficiency gains
that could be achieved by using a dynamic decision making process that
responds to information as it is revealed. Secondly, there is a
potential inconsistency in using an expected utility maximizing
framework for the agent in the exploration effort decision and an NPV
.~.L.m~r* r·r~r*·tvrr~~nr~lr~~1Q~z~.u~-~C~~~·Jm~
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approach in the discovery development valuation. It would
undoubtedly be better to use an expected utility approach throughout,
perhaps even for the principal's objective function.
Despite the above mentioned conceptual problems, Jordan's
contracting problem still fits nicely into Grossman and Hart's
framework. Jordan, clearly the principal in this application, owns
the petroleum resources, but cannot exploit them itself, because it
lacks the technological expertise to do so. It must rely on
experienced contractors, namely, multinational oil companies to
accomplish this. If Jordan wishes to maximize expected profits
subject to the fact that a given contractor is a risk averse expected
utility maximizer facing an exploration effort-discovery size
probability matrix of the type described above, a "second best"
sharing rule can be constructed to achieve this objective by solving
the static programming problem described in equations (1.1) - (1.3)
above.
It is natural enough to ask, under what conditions is it
reasonable to apply this approach to the 1986 Jordanian contracts?
One possible explanation is that the managers of the contracting
companies are risk averse and that they project their own personal
risk aversion into their analyses exploration decision. Recent
organizational behaviour literature suggest that this may indeed be
true. In the spirit of Grossman and Hart, I will assume this as
given.
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3.0 Terms and Conditions Of The 1986 Jordanian Contracts
The petroleum exploration and development agreements signed by
the two U.S. oil companes are for contract areas of 10,950 and 8,806
square kilometers within Jordan. The Natural Resources Authority of
Jordan (NRA) is the official signatory on the part of Jordan and is
responsible for overseeing Jordanian interests throughout the duration
of the contracts. Because the details of these agreements are
confidential, as well as different for each company, I will .not
disclose which agreement is associated with which company nor with
which specific geographic region within Jordan. It will suffice to
mention that the agreements cover tracts in the Jordan Valley, Azraq
and Al Jafr regions of the country. See Figure 3.1 for a map of these
areas.
To date some 43 exploratory wells have been drilled within
Jordan, 5 of which are current producers of oil. Production ran at a
rate of 42,000 barrels per year in the first half of 1986 - the last
period for which officially published figures are available. The
geology of the Jordan Valley, Azraq and Al Jafr areas are all quite
different. See Table 3.1 for details. Further geological and
seismological data are available in an NRA publication "Petroleum
Exploration Opportunities In Jordan". The interested reader is
referred to this source for additional information.
I propose to provide a detailed analysis of only one of the
exploration and development agreements, given that a similar analysis
could be conducted on the other. The basic structure of each
agreement is close enough that the general conclusions concerning the
-24-
Figure 3.1
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM
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C = Jordan Valley
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-25-
incentive problems in each case would more than likely be the same.
For the above mentioned reasons of confidentiality, I will refer to
the agreement under consideration as Agreement A and the associated
company as Company A. The salient features of Agreement A are
outlined below.
Table 3.1
Summary Of Exploration Area Geology
Azraq
Plays:
Reservoirs:
Source Rock:
Seal:
Jordan Valley
Plays:
Reservoirs:
Source:
Seal:
downthrown Fuluk block, upthrown Fuluk block
en echelon anticlines, west margin updip
anticlines
Triassic sand and carbonates, Albian-Aptian
sandstones Cenomanian-Turonian carbonates,
Capanian sandstones
Cenomanian-Turonian marls, Triassic shales
Paleozoic shales
shales
Evaporites
en-echelon folds, horsts, drape
tertiary
Maestichtlan
salt
Al-Jaer
Plays:
Reservoirs:
Source:
Seal:
basement arches with drape
Paleozoic
silurian
shales
Source: Natural Resources Authority of Jordan, "Petroleum
Exploration Opportunities In Jordan", Amman, Jordan, 1986.
Agreement A is divided into two phases, an exploration period and
and a commercial development period. The initial duration of the
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exploration period is 3 years, if no commercial discovery is made,
the exploration period may be extended twice at the option of the
contractor for 2 years and 2 1/2 years, respectively.
There are a number of minimum exploration commitments, which are
as follows:
o minimum $2 M exploration expenditure and one wildcat well
drilled during the initial 3 year exploration period
o minimum 2 wildcat wells drilled and 750 line km of seismic
data processed during each extension period
Also, the contractor must relinquish 25% of the original exploration
area during each extension period.
The contractor is responsible for all exploration and development
costs. These are recoverable from 40% of discovered crude oil
production ("cost petroleum") according to a recovery formula. This
recovery formula divides "cost petroleum" on a pro rata basis between
Jordan and Company A according to the total each party has outstanding
in the cost recovery pool. In the case of Company A, exploration
costs, development costs factored in at a depreciation rate determined
by Jordanian tax law, and production costs would be included in its
portion of the cost recovery pool. In the case of Jordan, recoverable
costs include a $13 M seismic and exploration data "fee" that is only
recoverable if a commercial discovery is made. The remaining 60% of
crude oil production plus any cost petroleum not used for cost
recovery ("shared petroleum") is divided between Jordan and Company A
according to the sharing rules listed in Table 3.2 below.
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Table 3.2
1
Incremental Oil Production Sharing Rules
Production Level Jordan Contractor
0 - 25,000 bbl/day .75 .25
25,000 - 50,000 bbl/day .78 .22
50,000 + bbl/day .80 .20
1. These sharing rules imply that Company A receives 25% of the first
25,000 barrels per day of oil, 22% of the next 25,000 and 20% of
all remaining daily production. These sharing rules are applied
to the 60% of total production available for sharing. The
remaining 40% of production is used for cost recovery, until all
costs are recovered, then it Is shared as above. A full example
is presented below.
The contractor must also pay a number of bonuses to Jordan that
are dependent on discovery size. These bonuses are considered
non-recoverable payments under the conditions of the contract. Table
3.3 below outlines the bonus payment scheme. In addition, the
contractor must pay a $40,000 per year advanced education scholarship
to Jordanian nationals during the exploration period increasing to
$160,000 per year if a commercial discovery is made. The contractor
is subject to Jordanian income taxes computed at an effective rate of
66% on provisional income defined as total revenues under the sharing
agreement less revoverable expenses.
A number of issues relating to the legal structure of the
relationship between the contractor and Jordan are included in the
agreement. However, they appear to have no substantive effect on the
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form of sharing rules employed. For example, on commencement of
commercial oil production a joint venture company, "Joram", is
supposed to take over management of the oil fields. Joram in all
likelihood will be staffed and run by employees of the contractor with
the contractor paying all operating costs. NRA officials will have
some nominal say in operational decisions. Thus, despite this legal
veil, the contractor is still actively managing all aspects of the
project. Discussion of hidden costs, if any, of these types of legal
arrangements is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 3.3
Bonus Payment Rules
Production Level Incremental Total
0 - 25,000 bbl/day $1M $1M
25,000 - 50,000 bbl/day $1M $2M
50,000 - 75,000 bbl/day $1M $3M
75,000 - 100,000 bbl/day $1M $4M
100,000 + bbl/day $1M $5M
In order to illustrate how the terms and conditions of Company
A's exploration and development agreement translate into a sequence of
cash flows, sample output from a financial model used to determine
discovery size NPV's is presented below.' A complete discussion
of the capital budgeting methodology underlying the financial model is
left until Section 4.0. The following discussion is limited to the
mechanics of the sharing rules employed in the agreement.
Table 3.4 below lists the annual cash flows to the contractor and
Jordan under a scenario in which 2 wildcat wells are drilled at a cost
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of $1.64M, leading to a discovery of a 50,000 barrel per day field for
which the prevailing wellhead price is $11.00 per barrel. The
exploration period is assumed to have an expected life of three years
and the development period an expected life of two years, thus causing
expected commercial production to begin in year 6.
Under terms of the agreement, Company A has initial recoverable
costs of 1.64 + 136.08 + 136.08 = $273.80 M, which are equal to total
exploration and development costs. Annual production costs of
$13.60 M are added to this pool each year. Jordan has a recoverable
cost of $13 M (its exploration data "fee"). Total annual oil
production is 50,000 barrels per day, which is divided into a 60%
shared pool and a 40% cost recovery pool. Company A receives 23.5% of
the 60% shared oil pool. This 23.5% figure is calculated as 20% of
the first 25,000 barrels of oil and 22% of the next 25,000 barrels of
oil, resulting in a 23.5% weighted average share.
The 40% cost recovery pool is divided between Jordan and
Company A on a pro rata basis in which Company A recieves 95% and
Jordan 5%, according to the size of their relative claims. Thus in
the first year of commercial operations, Company A receives
.235 x .60 + .95 x .40 = 52.1% of total oil production. This figure
falls gradually to 23.5% as Company A recovers its exploration and
development costs over time. This observation is borne out by the
data in Table 3.4A, which shows Company A's cash flows declining from
$88.32 M in year 6 to $23.62M in year 25.
Column 1 of Table 3.4A shows cash outflows of $2.46 M (PV of
exploration expenditures) and $0.04 M (scholarship payments) in year 1
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for the contractor. Because the $0.04 M is a transfer from the
contractor to Jordan, the net cash flows for the project as a whole
are only -$2.46 M. Oil field development expenditures of $136.08 M are
shown to occur in years 4 and 5, which comprise the two year expected
development period. These exploration and development expenditures
and all production related expenses borne by the contractor are
recoverable from cost petroleum. Column 6 of Table 3.4 B shows an
initial cost recovery on the part of the contractor of $76.78M and on
the part of Jordan of $3.52 M according to the pro rata sharing rules
described above. Recall that a $13M seismic "fee" is considered a
recoverable cost for Jordan. Total recoverable costs of $80.4 M
amount to 40% of the value of all oil produced ($200.75 M) leaving the
remaining oil production of $120.45 M to be shared between the
contractor and Jordan according to the 23.5% sharing rule yielding
allocations of $28.31 M and $92.14 M, respectively.
Section 4.2 below provides a detailed treatment of inflation,
discount rates, oil prices, exploration costs, development costs,
production costs, depreciation rates, effective income tax rates and
other assumptions used in the financial model of the 1986 Agreement.
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Table 3.4A
Project Net Cash Flows
(Assumptions Listed On Next Page)
Contractor Jordan Project
(1.68)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(136.11)
(136.11)
88.32
90.65
91.59
88.48
35.79
32.13
29.56
27.76
26.50
25.62
25.01
24.57
24.27
24.06
23.91
23.81
23.74
23.69
23.65
23.62
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
98.83
96.50
95.56
98.67
151.36
155.02
157.59
159.39
160.65
161.53
162.14
162,58
162.88
163.09
163.24
163.34
163.41
163.46
163.50
163.53
(1.64)
0.00
0.00
(136.08)
(136.08)
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
187.15
NPV at 10% 97.57 793.87 891.44
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4.0 Valuation Of Petroleum Discoveries
4.1 Capital Budgeting Methodology
This section employs some standard capital budgeting techniques
to estimate discovery size net present values (NPV's). The capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965)
and numerous other financial economists is the framework chosen for
the analysis. Any modern corporate finance textbook such as Brealy
and Myers (1984) or Copeland and Weston (1983) provide excellent
treatments of the theory underlying this approach, therefore I will
only briefly summarize its salient features.
Application of CAPM to project evaluation requires the
calculation of expected (probability weighted) project cash flows on a
year by year basis. These cash flows are then adjusted to certainty
equivalent levels using an adjustment factor that depends on a
project's covariance with the market portfolio (i.e, portfolio of all
other investment opportunities available). The certainty equivalent
cash flows are then discounted at a risk free discount rate.
Alternatively, if it is difficult to compute the covariance of
project's cash flows with the market portfolio, the expected cash
flows can be discounted at a rate which accurately reflects their
"activity risk" in relation to the market portfolio. This can be
accomplished by "observing" a cost of capital for an activity with
risk characteristics similar to that of the project in question.
The fundamental equilibrium relation underlying CAPM which
characterizes expected rates of return required by capital is:
L i."I~-7:· riL~Y~ Pb~:- ·dl~s~rC~- ~-11~ ~rr~~~:rr·1~4~'~rA~ hi;~jTJ;b~(~+"C~iSB*~bi~,Y·iTC*t~Sr~Jar WOi*~b' 129*-~i~Fll~W~~~l~t~YI~*III~L~-· :~Ulrr- V~i*UV~IJIZBLILIOP~i~I1I~~J~I~F~Clr~.~l~ PZIXX*~
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E[r ] = r, + Bi [ E[r, I - r, ]
where, Bi = cov(r ,r. )/var(r,), r, is the risk free rate of return,
E[r,] is the expected return on the market portfolio and E[ri ] is the
required expected rate of return on the i-th investment activity.
In theory at least, a discount rate appropriate for oil exploration
and development activity in Jordan can be estimated by computing the
beta (B,) of stochastic project cash flows with the international
market portfolio.
Key variables which may contribute to project covariance with the
international market portfolio are oil prices, physical capital
prices, wage rates and exchange rates. Exploration risk will not be
correlated with the market portfolio and hence will not affect the
discount rate, even though it will affect the expected value
calculations of the cash flows.
There are a number of other considerations, some of which were
alluded to in Section 1.0, which may effect discovery size value.
These include:
o ability to diversify commodity price risk in international
capital markets
o ability to diversify exploration risk in international capital
markets
o economic externalities arising from foreign investment in
Jordan, i.e, access to previously unavailable technologies
If Jordan's national income is highly correlated with oil prices,
then Jordan may place a lower value on oil related income given an
inability to diversify this risk away in international capital
markets. This is not an unreasonable assumption given that its major
-38-
trading partners all have oil dependent economies. In a similar vein,
Jordan may not be able to diversify away exploration risk, thus again
putting downward pressure on oil income valuation. Within the context
of CAPM, these types of market imperfections would manifest themselves
in a higher discount rate for oil related cash flows for Jordan
relative to a multinational oil company acting as agent-contractor.
On the other hand, the presence of economic externalities due to
technology transfer, expenditure multiplier effects and so on could
serve to raise the valuation of a project by a host government
relative to an agent-contractor. Economic externalities may or may
not offset the effects of potentially higher discount rates due to
inability of the host government to diversify certain types of risk.
It is important to note that there exits a substantial literature
on the use of social as opposed to private discount rates for the
evaluation of public sector projects. For example, Harberger (1963)
argues that the appropriate social discount rate should be the
opportunity cost of the marginal source of public funds. He allows
for foregone income tax, sales tax, tariff, foreign exchange and
labour externalities in his calculation of an average cost of public
funds. However, he does not treat activity risk explicitly in his
analysis.
In the interests of simplicity, a real discount rate of 10% is
applied to project cash flows to determine discovery size NPV's.
This figure was estmitated using the returns to shareholders equity
published in Company A's 1986 annual report. It is assumed to be the
same for both Jordan and an agent-contractor. Considerations of the
-39-
type outlined above, while beyond the scope of this analysis, could
most certainly be allowed for in further work.
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4.2 Summary Of Parameter Assumptions For The Financial Model
Of 1986 Jordanian Contracts
This section presents a brief documentation of all assumptions
used in the financial model. These are listed in point-form under
a number of subject headings below.
Time Horizon
o The total time horizon is 25 years, broken down into a
3 year exploration period, a two year development .period and
a 20 year production period after which oil field title
reverts to Jordan.
Real Discount Rates
o 10% real discount rate for both Jordan and contractor
o No allowance for interest tax shields due to leverage. Jordan
does not allow for interest tax shields within the contract
structure, however, a contractor's host country more than
likely allows for such deductions.
Oil Price Expectations
o The oil price process is assumed to have a martingale type
structure, in which case the current value is equal to the
expected future value.
o The expected oil price is set equal to the average of the
F.O.B. Persian Gulf prices quoted in the March 15 issue of
the Wall Street Journal, roughly $13.00 U.S. per barrel
o The wellhead price is assumed to be $13.00 less a $2.00
transportation cost to the point of shipment, roughly
$11.00. This can be viewed as a somewhat conservative
expected price structure.
Treatment Of Inflation
o All analysis is conducted in constant 1988 U.S. dollars.
Inflation will have an effect on the real value of recoverable
costs, however, these effects are judged to be small given
low inflation forecasts.
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Exploration, Development And Production Cost Assumptions
o Exploration, development and production cost assumptions were
derived using a methodology similar to that in Adelman (1986)
o An average output of 250 barrels per day was assumed for oil
wells in Jordan. This figure is similar to average daily
output rates in neighbouring countries such as Syria and
Egypt. Exploration, development and production costs were
scaled up from figures derived for this typical sized well.
o An average well depth of 10,800 feet was assumed, similar to
average well depths in Syria and previous wells drilled in
Jordan. Using U.S. Department of Energy's "Indexes and
Estimates of Domestic Well Drilling Costs" a total drilling
cost of $819,760 per well was derived.
o Adelman (1986) estimates that total development costs are
roughly 166% of drilling costs, thus development costs of
$1,360,000 per 250 barrel per day well are assumed. This
is equal to a development cost of $5,443/barrel/day.
o Annual production costs are assumed to be 5% of development
costs, $272/barrel/day.
Recoverable Cost Assumptions
o 66% of development expenditures are classified as depreciable,
the remaining 34% are eligible for immediate recovery.
o 30% declining balance depreciation rate is applied to
depreciable expenditures implying that 30% of the pool of
depreciable expenditures is recoverable each year.
Jordanian Income Tax Calculations
o taxable income is computed as oil revenues less recoverable
costs
o an effective tax rate of 66 1/3% is applied to taxable income
greater than zero. No loss carryforwards are permitted.
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4.3 Minimum Commercially Viable Discovery Sizes
And The Undercompletion Problem
Table 4.1 below lists the smallest discovery sizes viable for
commercial development given that exploration costs are sunk. These
minimum viable discovery sizes were computed by finding the oil
production level at which the NPV of financial cash flows became zero
under the assumptions of the financial model described in Sections 4.1
and 4.2. Column 1 shows the minimum viable discovery size necessary
for a "first best" situation in which one party can capture all
project benefits.
The data indicate that the discovery sizes which yield a project
NPV of at least zero are quite small, ranging from 45 barrels per day
for a discount rate of 5% to 94 barrels per day for a discount rate of
20%. However, under terms of the 1986 Jordanian contracts the minimum
viable discovery size for commercial development from the point of
view of Company A is an order of magnitude larger than that for the
project as a whole.
The data in columns 2, 3 and 4 indicate that the minimum viable
discovery size for Company A is is quite sensitive to both the
discount rate and the number of wells drilled. Recall that
recoverable costs are a function of exploration and development
expenditures, thus for fixed development expenditures higher levels of
sunk exploration expenditures will lead to larger cash flows in the
development phase for a contractor. For example, with five
exploration wells drilled and a discount rate of 5% the minimum viable
discovery size is 450 barrels per day for Company A, whereas for a
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discount rate of 20% the minimum viable discovery size is 2,500
barrels per day. Clearly, the minimum viable discovery size under
terms of the 1986 Jordanian contract is not only an order of magnitude
larger, but also much more sensitive to changes in the discount rate
than is the project minimum viable discovery size for the total
project.
These results appear to indicate that an agent-contractor would
forego development of jointly profitable oil fields, because the
sharing rule under the terms of the 1986 Jordanian agreements is not
sufficiently generous for small to moderate discovery sizes. As we
will see in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, foregone development opportunities
will lead to significantly lower ex ante expected profits on the part
of Jordan as well as to lower than optimal levels of exploration
effort on the part of the agent-contractor. Wolfson (1985) terms this
an undercompletion problem. Note that the undercompletion problem is
an ex post incentive problem with ex ante implications for drilling
effort.
Table 4.1
Smallest Discovery Sizes Viable For
Commercial Development Given That
Exploration Costs Are Sunk
(bbl/day)
Discount Min Discovery Min Discovery Size For Company A
Rate Size For Under Conditions Of 1986 Agreement
Total Project
2 Wells 5 Wells 10 Wells
5.00% 45 600 490 385
10.00% 59 975 740 600
15.00% 75 2,300 1,650 1075
20.00% 94 14,600 11,950 5,450
-44-
5.0 Estimation Of Exploration Effort-Discovery Size
Probability Matrices
The purpose of this section is to discuss the calculations used
to construct exploration effort - discovery size probability matrices
which lie at the heart of an analysis of the effort related incentive
problems inherent in the structure of the 1986 Jordanian contracts.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, some simplifying assumptions must be made
concerning the ex ante decision making process in order to construct a
Grossman and Hart (1983) effort-outcome probability matrix. Namely,
the "real-world" intertemporal exploration-development decision
problem must be collapsed into a single period decision problem, in
which the level of exploration effort chosen this period will affect
the probability of achieving a given discovery size next period. This
decision problem can be characterized by an effort-outcome matrix of
the type shown below.
Table 5.1
Exploration Effort-Discovery Size Probability Matrix
Outcome: q, q q . . . . q
npv, npv 2  npv, . . . . npvy
Effort
a, P(11a1 ) P(21a, ) . . . P(mla1 )
a 2
P(ml a )
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In keeping with a number of approaches used in the exploration
geology literature, i.e, Adelman et al. (1983), the amount of
discoverable oil is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with
paramenters u and s. This implies that the logarithm of the discovery
size (expressed as a production rate in barrels per day) is normally
distributed with mean u and variance s 2 or equivalently discovery size
is lognormally distributed with mean exp(u+.5s 2 ) and variance
exp(u+.5s )2 x (exp(s 2 )-1)2 . Discovery size is expressed as a daily
production rate in order to be consistent with the sharing rules
outlined in the 1986 Jordanian contracts.
Because the lognormal distribution is a skewed distribution in
which the median lies to the left of the mean, it is conceptually
helpful to use the median as the location parameter of interest rather
than mean. For example, if median discovery size were 1,000 barrels
per day with a log standard deviation of of 20%, then the mean or
expected discovery size would be exp(6.91 + .5x1.382) = 2,591 barrels
per day, where 6.91 = log(1000) and 1.38 = .20 x 1,000.
As a second step in costructing an effort-outcome probability
matrix, I have chosen an 8 point discretization of the lognormal
discovery size probability distribution where each point is exactly
one standard deviation apart from the next on the log scale. In terms
of the logarithm of discovery size, the eight points in question begin
-3.5 standard deviations to to the left of the mean and progress to
3.5 standard deviations to the right of the mean in units of one
standard deviation. A discretization of the data from the example
given above, would yield points in terms of the logarithm of discovery
11- __1ý11_11ýý - _ _ _ _ _ _ -_'P~~Ur~~-rr~~ C C~ *~`~~1 · rr~·.·rnr·.~r,.ry·cl~r . .r -- ~.,rr· rr-rr.,r _rrr (C·~Wnl**~%.&r~UICi~~lcF~:~uYI~Bbr~.S·i
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size of 2.07, 3.45, 4.84, 6.22, 7.60, 8.98, 10.36 and 11.74
(log bbl/day), where the points are generated according to the
equation (6.91 - 3.5 x 1.38) + (N+1) x 1.38 (N is equal to to the n-th
point). In terms of original units we would have discovery sizes of
8, 32, 126, 501, 1,995, 7,943, 31,623, and 125,893 barrels per day
occurring with probabilities of 0.0013, 0.0214, 0.136, 0.3413, 0.3413,
0.136, 0.0214 and 0.0013, respectively. The expected discovery size
according to the discretization is 2,790 barrels per day which is
fairly close to the 2,591 barrels per day predicted by the continuous
distribution.
A binomial probability distribution is used to relate exploration
effort as measured by the number of wildcat wells drilled to the
discovery size probability distribution. For example, if the wildcat
probability is p, then there is a conditional probability, p, of
finding oil according to the lognormal probability distribution, if
one well is drilled. If two wells are drilled then the probability is
1 - (1-p) 2 ; if three wells are drilled then the probability is
1 - (1-p)S , and so on. Therefore, the total probability of a given
discovery size conditional on k wells being drilled is simply
1 - (l-p)k multiplied by the appropriate discrete probability
determined according to the procedure outlined above. Thus, given a
lognormal discovery size distribution with median 1000 and a
logarithmic standard deviation of 20%, the discrete probability of
finding a field with output 501 barrels per day would be
0.3413 x (1 - (l-p) k ). Similar calculations can be made for all
other points of the discrete approximation to the lognormal
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distribution. The mean discovery size would be
2,790 x (1 - (l-p)k).
The binomial model relating exploration effort to the probability
of discovery is a well behaved concave function with a number of
desirable properties. Firstly, it exhibits a diminishing marginal
return to exploration effort in that the gain in ex ante expected
discovery size decreases with increasing k. Given that exploration
costs increase with the number of wells drilled, a diminishing
marginal return to exploration will ensure that there is an upper
bound on exploration effort for any ex ante profit or utility
maximizing economic agent. Secondly, the effectiveness of exploration
effort can be readily characterized by the binomial probability, p.
This feature will prove useful for the discussions concerning the
conditions under which incentive problems inherent in the 1986
Jordanian contract structure are large. Thirdly, this binomial model
bears some semblance to actual exploration reality in that wildcat
well drilling is very much a discrete activity with binomial type
outcomes.
Sample exploration effort-discovery size probability matrices are
shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below. Figure 5.1 shows how the shape
of the probability distribution for discovery size changes as the
level of exploration activity is varied. Net present values for
discovery size were computed according to the capital budgeting
methodology outlined in Section 4.0. If the NPV of a particular
discovery size is found to be less than zero, then it is assumed that
the well is not commercial viable and hence will not be developed. As
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Figure 5.1
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a result, the lower bound placed on discovery size NPV's is zero.
Note that as mentioned in Section 4.0, no abandonment option values
are included in these NPV calculations should oil prices fall below
levels at which it is economically viable to produce oil. However,
these option values are likely to be small since there are no capital
expenditures other than the initial development expenditures, and as
well, operating costs are small in relation to current oil prices .
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6.0 Calculation Of The Ex Ante Incentive Effects
Of The 1986 Jordanian Contracts
6.1 First Best Sharing Rule: Empirical Results
Table 6.1 below presents first best results for a number of
scenarios of the exploration effort - discovery size model. Recall
from the discussion of Section 2.0 that a first best outcome occurs
when the ex ante expected profits of the project are maximized, i.e,
expected value of discovery size less exploration costs. A first best
outcome assumes that there are no incentive costs. It can be
implemented by selling the entire project to an expected profit
maximizing agent-contractor or if this is not feasible, by designing a
sharing rule - such as a forcing contract - that just compensates the
contractor for the costs of drilling on an ex ante basis.
For example, if p = 0.2 and e" = 1000, then the first best level of
drilling effort is 12 wells, which will yield an expected profit of
$36.48M to the project as a whole. As the exploration effort -
discovery size probability matrix indicates, if one more (less) well
is drilled the expected profit expected profit will fall by $0.80 M .
In this case, it would be optimal for Jordan to sell all development
rights to a contractor for $36.48 M and thus avoid any incentive costs
due to imperfect monitoring of a contractor's effort. As mentioned
previously, incentive costs arise when a contractor whose effort
cannot be perfectly monitored is risk averse in the sense of
exhibiting expected utility maximizing behaviour .
The data indicate that optimal drilling effort increases as the
location parameters of the lognormal discovery size distribution
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increase and decreases with the productivity of drilling effort as
expressed by the wildcat probability parameter, p. These results are
not surprising, since a greater expected discovery size increases the
expected marginal value of additional drilling effort, while a greater
wildcat probability parameter decreases the expected marginal value
of additional drilling effort. A rough rule of thumb seems to be that
doubling the wildcat probability parameter causes optimal drilling
effort to fall by a factor of one-half.
We will see that the expected profits accruing to Jordan as a
percentage of total project expected profits under a second best
sharing rule or the 1986 Agreement sharing rule decrease as both
median discovery size (e") increases and drilling effort productivity
(p) increases. Intuitively, one would expect this result because the
sensitivity of first best expected profits to drilling effort
decreases as both these parameters increase. This point can be
illustrated by the fact that for a median discovery size of 25-,000
barrels per day, 98% of first best expected profits can be achieved by
drilling only 4 wells, even though optimal drilling effort required to
reach a first best solution is 32 wells. Each additional well drilled
increases expected project profits only by a small amount. A
perusal of the effort - probability of discovery matrices in
Appendix A will confirm this observation.
r-r*~r~Z~;(B~7~jriXi~-~(~·h~*~j~ii~L~~U" T
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Table 6.1
First Best Results
Median
Discovery
Size
(bbl/day)
First Best
Drilling
Effort
(wells)
Cost Of Expected
Drilling Value Of
Discovery
($ M) ($ M)
1
Expected
Profit
To Jordan
($ M)
Wildcat Probability = 0.2
6.56
9.84
13.94
17.21
21.31
26.23
16.96
46.32
162.29
418.09
1,089.41
3,948.29
Wildcat Probability = 0.4
4.10
5.74
7.38
9.02
10.66
13.12
18.80
48.35
164.36
420.45
1,091.30
3,950.31
Wildcat Probability = 0.6
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
2.46
3.28
4.92
5.74
6.56
7.38
19.08
47.38
165.35
421.29
1,091.98
3,950.38
1. In the notation of Section 2.0, expected first best
Jordan, FB = argmax 1k] Bk - ak.
16.62
44.10
160.43
415.55
1,085.42
3,943.00
profit to
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
10.40
36.48
148.35
400.88
1,068.10
3,922.05
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
14.70
42.61
156.98
411.43
1,080.64
3,937.19
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6.2.0 Second Best Sharing Rule
6.2.1 Contractor Risk Aversion And Choice Of Utility Function
Grossman and Hart (1983) consider separable utility functions of
the form G(a) + K(a)V(I), where 'a' denotes effort, I denotes monetary
income, V is an increasing concave function and K is strictly
positive. They derive a number of results relating the probability
structure of the effort-outcome matrix to the shape of the sharing
rule based on this form of utility function and a number of other
technical conditions. The negative exponential utility function,
-e-b ( - a), is of the separable form considered by Grossman and Hart.
Its parameter 'b' is a measure of local absolute risk aversion.
Hence, greater 'b' implies greater risk aversion.
A number of second best scenarios were run using alternate values
of 'b'. It was found that values in the neighbourhood of 0.01 yielded
the most sensible results, in that for median discovery sizes of 1000
to 5000 barrels per day with logarithmic variance of 20%, a feasible
second best sharing rule could be found. Values of 'b' greater than
0.1 tended to be infeasible, whereas values less than 0.003 tended to
give results that are close to risk neutral - meaning the agent acts
almost as if it were an expected profit maximizer.
A logarithmic utility function was tested as an alternative to
the negative exponential utility function and was found to give
remarkably similar results. For example, the optimal levels of
drilling effort tended to differ by at most one well for utility
specifications that were logarithmic with intial wealth of $30 M, or
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negative exponential with b = .01. In these cases the optimal sharing
rules were virtually identical thereby yielding virtually identical
expected profits to Jordan.
Logarithmic utility within the context of the Grossman and Hart
framework has a number of desirable properties. Firstly, initial
wealth can be interpreted as the agent's budget constraint. For
example, if a particular manager or department within an oil company
has a target budget which cannot be exceeded, then the logarithmic
utility function will "blow-up" if losses on the project exceed the
initial wealth (budget) that is specified. It "blows-up" in the sense
that the marginal utility of additional income becomes infinite,
yielding infeasible solutions to the second best optimization program.
The logarithmic utility function can be thought of as a penalty
(benefit) function assigned by management to potential losses (gains)
from a project. As loss levels approach the budget constraint, higher
and higher penalties are assigned.
Grossman and Hart's second best algorithm imposes no restrictions
on the sign of the payments that an agent-contractor can receive.
Thus, an agent may receive a negative payment, i.e, it must pay the
principal a positive amount should a particular outcome be realized.
Experimentation with the second best algorithm revealed that negative
payments to the agent tended to occur for outcomes with both low
effort related probability and low discovery levels. This caused
proportionate sharing rules to be "humped" shaped with negative
initial shares.
There is reason to believe that negative sharing rules, which can
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be viewed as penalty payments for low discovery sizes, are
unacceptable for institutional reasons. Casual observation indicates
that no such contract structures are in force. Therefore,
non-negativity constraints were imposed on the the second best sharing
rule, i.e, a lower bound of zero was set. Also, the payouts to the
agent were bounded from above by the total outcome NPV, i. e, by 100%
of available profits. Experimentation revealed that these boundary
conditions had virtually no effect on second best drilling effort and
a small effect, in the order of 5%, on the expected payouts to the
agent-contractor.
6.2.2 Empirical Results
Table 6.2 below presents second best results for a number
of scenarios of the exploration effort - discovery size model. 2
These were calculated assuming logarithmic utility with an initial
wealth of $30 M. The results reveal that as median discovery size and
wildcat probabilities increase, the incentive cost of a second best
sharing rule decreases. For example, second best expected profits to
Jordan are 68% of first best profits for a median discovery size of
500 barrels per day with a wildcat probability of 0.2. Alternatively,
the incentive cost is 32% of first best expected profits. This
incentive cost decreases to 4% of first best expected profits as
median discovery size increases to 25,000 barrels per day. For a
median discovery size of 500 barrels per day and a wildcat probability
of 0.6, the incentive cost of a second best sharing rule is only 15%
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Table 6.2
Second Best Algorithm Results
Median Optimal Cost Of Expected
Discovery Drilling Drilling Payment To
Size Effort Contractor
(bbl/day) (wells) ($ M) ($ M)
Wildcat Probability = 0.2
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
3.28
4.92
7.38
9.84
11.48
13.94
5.01
9.26
19.12
36.93
54.52
98.23
Expected First Best
Profit Expected
To Jordan Profit
($ M) ($ M)
7.03
27.44
124.69
356.03
989.81
3,757.80
10.40
36.48
148.35
400.88
1,068.10
3,922.05
Wildcat Probability = 0.4
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
2.46
3.28
4.92
4.92
6.56
6.56
4.42
7.81
21.48
20.96
52.83
57.32
11.57
35.49
136.81
381.34
1,021.60
3,835.50
14.70
42.61
156.98
411.43
1,080.64
3,937.19
Wildcat Probability = 0.6
1.64
1.64
2.46
3.28
3.28
4.10
2.83
2.82
7.35
17.45
17.40
37.75
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
14.29
38.96
148.09
393.83
1,047.70
3,874.90
16.62
44.10
160.43
415.55
1,085.42
3,943.00
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of first best expected profits. These data indicate that for low
median discovery sizes 500 to 2,500 barrels per day and low wildcat
probabilities in the order of 0.2, second best sharing rules while
feasible yield high incentive costs. Figure 6.1 provides a graphical
illustration of how incentive costs vary with median discovery size
and wildcat probability.
Table 6.3 below shows the optimal second best sharing rules in
dollar amounts for the scenarios listed in Table 6.2, while Figures
6.2 to 6.4 provide graphical illustrations of these sharing rules.
Note that the second best sharing rules expressed as a percentage of
discovery size NPV roughly have the shape of a rectangular hyperbolas
in that they start off near 100% for small discovery sizes and decline
monotonically to very low levels for large discovery sizes.
Consider, the scenario where eu = 1000 and p = 0.2. For
discovery sizes of 8 and 32 barrels per day it is not optimal to
develop the oil field. For discovery sizes of 126 and 501 barrels per
day, it is optimal to give the agent-contractor 100% of the project
NPV. For the remaining four higher discovery sizes, the
agent-contractor receives a share that declines from 50% to 0.92% of
the total project NPV. Under this scenario, the second best sharing
rule achieves an expected profit of $27.44 M for Jordan, roughly 75%
of the first best expected profit level. The $9.26 M payment to the
contractor consists of
$4.92 M compensation for drilling costs and $4.34 M compensation for
risk aversion imbedded in the expected utility function.
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Figure 6.1
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Figure 6.3
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Figure 6.4
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6.3 Sharing Rules Implicit In The 1986 Jordanian Contracts
Table 6.4 below lists the discovery size NPV's that would be
captured by Company A under the terms of its agreement with Jordan
according to the assumptions outlined in Sections 3.0 and 4.0. In NPV
terms, the contractual sharing rule increases in output in an almost
linear fashion. As a percentage of total project NPV, Company A's
share rises monotonically until it peaks at around 25,000 bbl per day
then falls gradually to a level of roughly 10%. This "humped" shape
to the percentage shares can be explained by the fact that the
contractor receives a smaller portion of incremental output as total
oil production increases. Recall that the contractor's incremental
share falls from 25% of "shared petroleum" at production rates of
under 25,000 bbl/day to 20% at production rates over 100,000 bbl/day.
In discovery size ranges from 1,000 to 25,000 bbl per day, one
can think of the percentage sharing rule as rising monotonically at a
decreasing rate to an asymptote of around 12% (see Figure 6.5). This
percentage sharing rule is the complete inverse of the second best
sharing rules determined by Grossman and Hart's algorithm which tend
to start close to 100% and then decrease montonically to an asymptote.
The inverted structure of the contractual sharing rule tends to result
in lower than optimal exploration levels due to lower ex ante expected
gains from exploration on the part of the contractor. In addition, an
ex post undercompletion problem arises when smaller sized discoveries
are made, namely, in the 600 to 6,000 barrel per day range.
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Table 6.4
1986 Agreement Sharing Rule
Discovery
Size
1,000
2,000
3,000
10,000
25,000
50,000
75,000
100,000
NPV To NPV To Contractor
Project----------------
2 Wells 10 Wells
17.86
35.72
53.58
178.62
446.54
893.08
1339.62
1786.16
0.05
2.41
4.62
19.90
52.93
99.32
142.16
184.96
1.68
4.47
7.04
23.34
56.90
101.96
144.55
187.37
Share Of Project Benefits
2 Wells 10 Wells
0.28%
6.75%
8.62%
11.14%
11.85%
11.12%
10.61%
10.36%
9.41%
12.51%
13.14%
13.07%
.12.74%
11.42%
10.79%
10.49%
1. Exploration costs are assumed sunk for the purposes of the sharing
rule.
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6.4 Contractor's Optimal Exploration Effort Under Terms
1986 Jordanian Contracts
The ex ante expected profits to Jordan of the 1986 Agreement it
signed with Company A are low in relation to both first and second
best sharing sharing rules for low to moderate potential discovery
levels as measured by the location parameters eu and s. As the level
of potential discoveries increases the differences in ex ante profits
between the 1986 Agreement and first and second best sharing rules
decrease in relative terms, while remaining large in absolute terms.
The 1986 Agreement has a high incentive cost because it misallocates
risk and suffers from an under completion problem. The analysis of
Section 6.2 suggests that a proper allocation of project risk requires
that the contractor be given relatively high shares of project
benefits at low discovery levels and low shares at high discovery
levels. The sharing rule implicit in the 1986 agreement achieves the
exact opposite of this result. Also, as pointed out in Section 4.3,
the 1986 Agreement suffers from an under completion problem at low
discovery levels, thus causing a further decrease in ex ante expected
profits to Jordan.
Table 6.5 below provides some illustrations of the incentive
costs of the 1986 Agreement under a number of scenarios. At median
discovery levels of 1,000 barrels per day and under, an expected
utility maximizing contractor would not even choose to enter into an
agreement. At a median discovery size of 2,500 barrels per day the
incentive cost varies from roughly 30% of first best expected profits
for a wildcat probability of 0.2 to 12% for a wildcat probability of
-70-
0.6. As median discovery size increases to 25,000 barrels per day,
incentive costs fall to a level of 10% of first best expected profits.
Figure 6.6 provides a graphical summary of the data in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5
Relationship Between Optimal Drilling Effort And Expected
Profit To Jordan Under The 1986 Agreement Sharing Rule
Median
Discovery
Size
(bbl/day)
Optimal
Drilling
Effort
(wells)
Cost Of Expected Expected
Drilling Payment To Profit
Contractor To Jordan
($ M) ($ M) ($ M)
Wildcat Probability = 0.2
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
0
0
6
9
12
16
0.00
0.00
4.92
7.38
9.84
13.12
0.00
0.00
12.55
40.31
106.28
383.54
0.00
0.00
110.00
325.04
911.33
3,456.65
Wildcat Probability = 0.4
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
0.00
1.64
3.28
4.92
5.74
6.56
0.00
2.93
15.46
42.55
109.58
385.93
0.00
28.90
129.05
359.75
952.53
3,499.12
Wildcat Probability = 0.6
500
1,000
2,500
5,000
10,000
25,000
Wildcat binomial probability
Initial wealth = $30 M.
= 0.2
0.00
1.64
2.46
3.28
4.10
4.92
0.00
3.84
16.33
43.02
110.86
390.31
0.00
37.94
139.07
368.16
970.65
3,544.92
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6.5 Policy Recommendations And Conclusions
An analysis of the 1986 Jordanian Agreements reveals that there
are potentially large incentive costs under a number of circumstances.
If the sharing rule implicit in the 1986 Agreements is implemented,
then Jordan's ex ante expected profits are likely to be significantly
lower than first best and second best expected profits for low to
moderate levels of potential oil discoveries. Specifically, with
median oil discoveries of 500 to 2500 barrels per day with
logarithmic variance of 20%, the incentive costs of the 1986
Agreement will range between 100% and 30% of first best expected
profits and 100% and 12% of second best expected profits. As
discovery potential increases, the incentive costs of the 1986
Agreement sharing rule falls. For median discovery levels of 5000
barrels per day, the incentive cost falls to 18% of the first best
expected profits and will continue to fall to around 10% of expected
profits for median discovery sizes of 25,000 barrels per day or
more." Note that for median discovery sizes of 25,000 barrels per
day second best incentive costs are in the 1% to 4% range, depending
on wildcat probability level.
The analysis of Section 6.2 indicates that second best sharing
rules are feasible even for very low median oil discovery levels of
around 500 barrels per day and that for median discovery levels of
around 1,000 barrels per day their incentive cost is a very
respectable 36% of the first best expected profit. As median
discovery levels rise to 10,000 barrels per day or more, second best
incentive costs fall well below 10% of first best expected profits.
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A striking result of Section 6.3 was that the shape of the 1986
Agreement sharing rule is radically different from the shape of the
second best sharing rules. Not surprisingly, we see that the
contractual sharing rule is not generous enough relative to the second
best sharing rule at low realized discovery sizes (500 to 5000
barrels per day) and is too generous at high realized discovery sizes
(10000 + barrels per day). These differences result in significantly
lower ex ante expected profits for Jordan.
It is easy enough to convert the second best discovery
development NPV sharing rules into oil output sharing rules using the
financial model discussed in Section 4.0. Figure 6.7 provides such a
conversion. The structure of the financial model is such that for
feasible discovery sizes of 100+ barrels per day, shares of discovery
NPV's can be converted into shares of oil production in a roughly
linear fashion. For example, a 50% NPV share roughly corresponds to a
fixed 60% share of annual oil production, a 60% NPV share to a 73%
share of oil production and so on. Thus we see that the second best
sharing rules can be structured in a fashion consistent with output
sharing.
74-
Figure 6.7
In q0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0
AdN AO^Aooe!G 10 OJO
CD
C)
CF)
CLzO
D.
0
ot
;5
03
C,
0
--. OO
"o
-75-
Endnotes
1-1 These agreements will be referred to as the 1986 Agreements, 1986
Jordanian contracts or simply the agreements throughout the remainder
of the text. For the purposes of confidentiality, the names of the
companies signatory to these agreements will not be used.
1-2 Section 3.0 provides a more detailed description of the areas in
Jordan covered by the exploration and development agreements.
1-3 As will become evident in Section 3.0, the actual sharing rule
used in these agreements is a great deal more complicated than the
above description indicates. However, this brief introductory
description conveys the general sense of the sharing rule.
1-4 Expected profits achieved under a first best sharing rule place
and upper bound on the expected profits achievable under any possible
sharing rule.
1-5 Grossman and Hart assume that a contractor is an expected utility
maximizer, whereas the resource owner is an expected profit maximizer.
This particular objective function structure will cause an exploration
effort incentive problem, because of a contractor's higher degree of
risk aversion relative to the resource owner. In general, the
magnitude of the incentive costs of a sharing rule will depend on:
(i) the structure of the exploration effort - discovery size
probability matrix;
(ii) the objective function of the principal;
(iii) the objective function of the agent-contractor.
Within this framwork it is also possible to examine situations
in which the contractor and the resource owner are expected utility
maximizers.
1-6 Section 5.0 provides an explanation of what is meant by median
discovery levels and logarthmic variance.
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3-1 A financial model of the 1986 Agreement was developed on a
Lotus 123 spread sheet. This spreadsheet formed the basis of all
numerical calculations involving 1986 Agreement sharing rules.
This spreadsheet can be made available on request.
5-1 A Lotus 123 spreadsheet was developed to estimate the
exploration effort - discovery size probability matrices.
This spreadsheet can be made available on request
6-1 Note that a contractor will choose not to develop a discovery if
he receives a negative payment (NPV) from doing so.
6-2 These were calculated using the GAMS optimization package
developed by Kendrick and Meeraus (1985). Raghuram Rajan
(Sloan School of Management, MIT) kindly made available coded
GAMS routines to facilitate the analysis.
6-3 These figures assume a wildcat probability of 0.2.
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